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The remarkable  improvements  sustained by American  agriculture
over the past century have contributed immeasurably  to our national
quality  of life,  to our economic  strength at home  and  our stature  in
the larger global  community.  In spite of these singular  achieve-
ments, however,  rural America appears not to have prospered all
that much,  and the present outlook for the family  farm is prob-
lematical  at best. In  1900,  60 percent  of all  Americans  lived in small
towns  and rural areas,  with more than  40  percent of us actually  liv-
ing on the land,  on farms.  Today,  25 percent of the U.S.  population
lives in rural areas and just 1.9 percent on farms proper.
Of course,  25 percent of 250 million Americans  is still  62  million
people;  a large  rural nation by any  standard.  In fact,  in absolute
numbers,  our rural population  is greater  today than at  any  time  in
the  nation's history.  A  more troubling trend  is the recent  apparent
decline  in rural prosperity. Median  household  income in rural areas
has fallen or remained stagnant for most of the past twenty years,
and poverty in rural areas has risen substantially.
By  1990,  rural poverty rates had  begun to match U.S.  urban  lev-
els,  with 20  percent of rural households earning incomes  at or below
the poverty  level.  The slow  growth  and faltering prosperity  of rural
America are noteworthy when compared with the fact that, over the
past century, the amount of acreage  under cultivation in America
has essentially  doubled from 25  percent of all U.S. land in 1890 to 51
percent  in 1990,  and there  has been a twentyfold  increase  in annual
agricultural  income,  from roughly  $5  billion  in 1890  to  $100 billion in
1990.
The  conventional  explanation  for rural decline  in the  face  of bur-
geoning agricultural  productivity  has been the "industrialization"  of
American  farming through successive  waves  of technology.  Against
a backdrop  of rising and falling national  economic prosperity  and
episodic  surges  in population,  the march  of technologic  progress
across rural America has steadily increased  agricultural productivity
through the replacement of labor by capital-intensive  equipment and
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over the past century,  found economic  opportunity  in the  cities
where industrial technology created an endlessly expanding demand
for labor.
So  long  as  cities  continued  to  offer  attractive  employment  to sur-
plus rural  labor,  the  process  of agricultural  industrialization  dis-
rupted farm families'  lives,  but did not serve as a barrier  to the
steady,  generation-to-generation  rise in  their prosperity.  Less  fortu-
nate were  the generations  of small farmers  who remained  on the
land and always depended  on non-farm earnings for most of their in-
come.  So long  as  agriculture  remained  labor intensive,  rural Amer-
ica  was  densely  populated  with farmers,  farm workers  and their
families who needed a full range  of basic goods and services.  This
marketplace  demand,  in turn,  generated  salaried employment  to
augment the characteristically  inadequate  small farm income.
Unfortunately,  the workers  made surplus to the  agriculture  sector
took their  incomes  with them when they  migrated  to the  city.  With
the departure of that income,  there was less demand for the retail
trade  and  consumer  services  that once  provided  supplemental  em-
ployment  for the small farmers  and  their families.  Over time,  those
farmers  who adopted  industrial technologies  and scale  of operations
prospered,  while small-scale farmers increasingly  operated  at the
margins of the economy and technology,  to be wiped out by the hun-
dreds of thousands during periods  of economic downturn,  such as
1981-1983.
Ultimately,  technology  changed  the fundamental  nature  of farm-
ing in  America.  Before the  Industrial  Revolution,  the production  of
food and fiber was  the dominant  economic  activity in the United
States and,  with the exception  of a few bulk commodities,  involved
mostly small-scale producers  competing in local or regional markets.
Today, in our mature industrial  economy,  a combination  of produc-
tion  and  distribution  technologies  have  afforded  America's  farmers
the advantages  of industrial-scale  operations  and  access  to  massive
national and international  markets, enabling fewer than 4  percent of
all  establishments-100,000  farms-to produce more  than 50 percent
of the gross sales of the entire U.S. agricultural  sector.
The concentration  of American  farming  into  an ever-shrinking
number  of larger  and larger  producing  units  is an  entirely  predict-
able  consequence  of the industrialization  of agriculture.  Economists
have long understood the propensity  of mature mass markets  to be-
come  oligopolistic.  And while  farming  is not nearly  so concentrated
as steel making or auto manufacturing,  the underlying forces are the
same.  Economies  of scale give the large,  well-managed  producer  so
many  competitive  advantages  over  smaller  producers  in most mass
markets that,  eventually,  all small producers  are either absorbed or
otherwise eliminated  from competition.  There are  no  "mom-and-
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labor-intensive  industrial  America.  A  straight  line  extrapolation  of
the industrial model  upon the U.S.  agricultural  sector suggests that,
eventually,  the traditional  family  farm  will  simply become  unviable
in the face of industrial-scale  economics.
Basically,  America's  small  family farms  have been-and  will  con-
tinue  to be-the victims of industrial  era productivity-enhancing  ag-
ricultural  technology.  In fact,  during the past twenty years,  agri-
cultural  productivity  has risen much  faster than that of the nonfarm
U.S.  workplace,  so that those  displaced  by greater  efficiency on the
land  cannot easily  find  new  careers  in cities  already  filled  with  un-
employed  industrial workers  made  redundant  by  increasingly  pro-
ductive foreign  manufacturers.  Recently, moreover,  the productivity
of foreign farmers  has  even begun to challenge  our once  seemingly
unique capacity  to increase the output of America's farms to feed not
only ourselves,  but much of the rest of the world.
Much  of the rest of the world  is  now using the  same technologies
that have explosively increased  our own agricultural productivity.
The  "Green  Revolu  tion,"  its  most powerful  weapons  first  created
here in America, has swept across the farmlands of the world, boost-
ing the food production  of both developed  and developing  nations
alike.  Because  of  greater  national  self-sufficiency,  the  total  volume
of world  bulk  crop exports  has declined  since the  mid  1980s,  as  has
the U.S.  share  of those  exports.  In response to the  twin realities  of
our own  continuing  increases  in productivity  and falling  foreign  de-
mand,  the  U.S.  has already  taken more than  100  million  acres of
cropland  out of production  in the past ten years, nearly a 30 percent
reduction.  Moreover,  the conversion of the old Soviet Bloc to free
market economics  and private  land ownership seems likely  to make
the world's  last great grain importer self-sufficient  within less than a
decade,  further  reducing  global  demand  for America's  surplus out-
put.
Taken together,  the parametric  trends of the  recent past are con-
verging  to project a  compelling  vision  of agriculture  in  Twenty-first
Century America,  in which  90 percent  of commercial  agricultural
output  will be  concentrated  in the  hands  of fewer  than 50,000  farm
firms,  franchisees,  co-ops,  and holding companies.  The remainder  of
our agriculture  sector  in such  a scenario  would  be  made up of one
million or so part-time,  boutique and "hobby"  farmers.  Assuming
the continuation of agriculture  productivity  improvements at post-
WWII  rates,  plus shrinking  foreign  demand  and  stable  domestic
markets, another  100 million acres of land are likely to be withdrawn
from cultivation  in the United States by  2025,  with the  number of
rural  residents  actually  beginning  to  fall  sometime shortly  after  the
year  2000.
If the  mass  industrialization  of our  agriculture  continues,  human
habitation  will recede  from the  land,  even  in areas that are  agri-
19culturally  productive.  Farmers,  mostly  salaried  employees  by  2025,
will live  in the still-dwindling numbers  of viable rural communities-
mostly  county seats-or  in new  communities  built around interstate
highway junctions  and  interchanges.  Many  farmers  and farm fami-
lies displaced from agricultural production in this scenario will re-
main trapped  on the land, unable to  find improved  economic  oppor-
tunities in the cities.  Characteristically,  this is likely to drive rural
marriage and fertility rates down to match urban rates. The ultimate
evolution of this vision would be a Twenty-first  Century rural Amer-
ica in  which most farmers  will  commute  out to work at agricultural
production  sites  from  towns  that will  increasingly  be  scattered  like
social  oases in vast uninhabited  "deserts"  of high-tech,  high-yield
farmland.
Happily, past trends alone do not dictate the future,  although they
are powerful forces that instrumentally shape our institutions,  our
social utilities and our uses of technology.  Equally powerful in shap-
ing  the future  are future  trends  and developments.  Free trade,  for
example,  if adopted  worldwide,  would  almost  certainly  be  a  bo-
nanza  for  U.S.  agriculture,  opening literally  billions  of mouths to
America's bounty  as the superior free market producer  of food.  Un-
fortunately,  the  expansion  of free trade  is dependent  upon  political
action,  which  is  not  reliably  forecastable.  However,  demographics
can be reliably  forecast, and the United States is already the world's
third largest domestic  market  (254 million).  With the passage  of
NAFTA,  that  will  expand  to  include  Mexico's  90  million  and Cana-
da's 27 million. That 370 million is projected to grow to more than 550
million  people  by  2050,  as  North  America-including  the  United
States-is  expected  to  experience  the  fastest  population  growth
among all of the mature industrial nations.
With projected  domestic  market growth  in the hundreds  of mil-
lions of people,  U.S.  agriculture  obviously  need not fear extinction,
nor even,  perhaps,  acreage  reductions.  But  what about  the  family
farm and rural,  small town America?  Will  these cultural icons of our
past survive  into our future only as  distant memories, rural  life farm
museums  and  segments  of history  disks?  Are there  future realities
that will alter  the long-term  industrialization  of American  agri-
culture?  More  importantly,  are  there  compelling  public  interests or
reasons for contravening this free-market  trend, and are there legiti-
mate  policy  options  for  doing so?  To  consider these  questions  at all
meaningfully,  it is necessary  to put them in the larger  context of the
nation as a whole and, in particular,  of what is  going on in the rest of
the world's biggest economic enterprise,  the United  States of Amer-
ica.
The United States in the 1990s
During the  1980s,  U.S.  nonfarm employers spent $1 trillion on new
production  technology,  and their productivity  did not go up any fast-
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ductivity-enhancing  capital  goods.  From  1945  through  1965,  U.S.
productivity-and  personal income-increased  about  3  percent  per
year.  In  the past  twenty years,  by comparison,  productivity  and
compensation  rose  an average  of  .7  percent  to  .8  percent  per year;
less than inflation!  As a  result, real weekly  wages  for salaried  U.S.
workers  during the same  time period  have actually  fallen  nearly 20
percent,  from $315  per week in  1972 to only $255 per week  in Oc-
tober,  1992.  Median household income  remained  more or less un-
changed  over the same period,  but only because millions of wives
and  mothers  entered  the work force  to augment  their families'  de-
clining earnings.
The failure of $1 trillion in new workplace technology  to signifi-
cantly improve  U.S.  productivity  dismayed  many  observers,  includ-
ing the  employers  and  stockholders  who  spent the  money,  and  the
supply-side economists  who had designed the credit  policies and tax
incentives  to encourage  the expenditures  in the  first place.  Subse-
quent economic  reviews of the decade,  plus research  into tech-
nology transfer  and innovation rates,  quickly revealed the source  of
our failed expectations  and the true nature of this moment-our  mo-
ment-in history.
To begin with,  it is now clear that America is in the middle of a
genuine  techno-economic  revolution;  the sort  of transformational
event  about  which historians write entire chapters  in textbooks.  As
with all  technological  revolutions,  the  important reality is  not the
technology  itself,  but what the technology  enables  society  to do.  In
the case  of our own  "moment"  in history, computers and their relat-
ed technologies  are enabling  us to  shift from labor-intensive  produc-
tion  to information-intensive  production.  By increasing  the informa-
tion content  of every product  and service,  plus every operation and
job of every productive  activity,  and then equipping every  employee
with the skills, resources  and authority to make the best-informed
plans  and  decisions,  the  productivity  of every  institution and every
worker can be hugely increased!
But it will not happen overnight ...  or even in a decade.
It appears to take a generation-forty  to fifty years-in order to in-
corporate the  full productive  potential of a fundamentally new tech-
nologic capability throughout  all the levels and all the functions  of all
the private  and public  institutions in an  entire national  economy.  It
is,  after all, a big project. Large  systems are inherently stable,  made
so by the considerable  inertia of their multiple internal,  inter-con-
nected sub-systems.  In a system the size  of America, there  are liter-
ally hundreds of thousands of large  sub-systems-corporations,  fed-
eral,  state  and  local  government  agencies,  schools,  hospitals,
churches,  etc.-each  with  spheres  of interaction,  overlapping  con-
cerns and both shared and conflicting interests.
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All of these institutions,  in turn, are made up of individual people
who  must also assimilate  technologic innovation.  And, of course,  the
technology  itself takes time to evolve.  The  first commercial  com-
puters  (1953-1954)  were fifteen-foot-long  electro-mechanical  technol-
ogies  weighing  several  tons,  not  at  all  like the electronic  mini-mar-
vels of today.  And,  while  the 586-chip  machine (introduced in April,
1993)  is five times more powerful than the  486-chip machines  (which
we  have not yet fully mastered),  they are only one-fifth  as powerful
as  the  686-chip  technology projected  to  hit the marketplace  by  1996
or  1997. Computers clearly have not yet fully evolved.
All around  us  there is  ample  evidence  that  large systems  change
slowly.  But, just as importantly,  they do change.  And,  over time,
even incrementalism  will produce revolutionary  change.  In  the case
of America's current  "incremental  revolution,"  the data suggest we
are nearing  the midpoint of our transition  from labor-intensive  pro-
duction and management  to information-intensive  production and
management  (see Figure 1).  The data also show that, during the first
half of this forty- to fifty-year transition,  the rate at which new, high-
value jobs are created lags behind the rate at which existing high-
value jobs  are eliminated  from labor intensive  operations.  It  is this
phenomenon  more than anything else that has led to the decline  in
average  weekly  wages  in America,  and the  commensurate  stagna-
tion in family income both in the cities and the countryside.
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celerate  the rate at which they create  new, high-value,  information-
intensive  jobs.  Fortunately,  the  experience  of the  1980s  has  shown
us how to do this.  Even so, revolutionary  change is never easy.  It in-
volves us  all not merely in one "paradigm  shift," but many "para-
digm shifts,"  changes in institutional cultures,  in the collective  ex-
pectations  and  in the  personal identities  of every  segment  of the
American society and economy.
It is,  perhaps,  comforting  to know that the United  States  will not
be passing through this turbulent transformation alone.  We will be in
the company  of the other mature  industrial nations  of the  world.  In
fact, as the inventors and developers of the new information technol-
ogies,  we entered this revolutionary period in the early 1970s and
began to encounter significant  structural job displacement  about ten
years  ago.  The  other mature industrial  nations-notably those  in
Western  Europe and the  British Commonwealth  and Japan-en-
tered the  cycle  about ten years  later than the  United States  and
have  only  begun to  experience  serious  structural  unemployment  in
the past two or three years.
In all of the mature industrial  economies,  the temporary inefficien-
cies  of economic  restructuring  have  had  similar effects.  Long-term
income  growth  has  stagnated,  constraining  public  sector  revenues
and necessitating  reductions  in government programs.  Millions  of
jobs  have been permanently  eliminated,  and underlying  levels of
long-term unemployment have risen.  In the United  States, unions
have  commonly  accepted substantial  reductions  in pay and benefits
in  exchange  for continued  employment,  while  German  steel  and
auto  workers  have  accepted  four-day  work  weeks  and,  in Britain,
where miners' unions have refused to make such concessions, the
government has simply shut down the coal mines.
The mid-career  displacement of hundreds of thousands  of middle-
class workers has provoked another common phenomenon through-
out the industrial  world:  the rise of right-wing nationalist  and racist
hate groups and political movements,  as those  who have lost  eco-
nomic  security seek redress by attacks on immigrants and minorities
whom  they blame  for their diminished  expectations.  Such socio-po-
litical turbulence  is, of course,  characteristic  of periods  of techno-
economic  transition,  as  historic  accounts  of Britain's original  Indus-
trial Revolution make  clear.  In  the early Nineteenth Century,  mobs
of displaced  workers  stormed  through the streets of Nottingham,
Manchester  and Leeds, breaking into mills and smashing the power
looms whose prodigious output had eliminated their jobs.
Thus, the recent economic stagnation  in rural America  must be
considered  in the larger  context of the nation's economic restructur-
ing.  Current  administration  proposals  to eliminate  thirteen  of forty-
three U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) agencies,  1,200 USDA
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tem-wide  revenue  constraints than they  are the result of a national
sentiment to reduce  our commitment  to progressive  farming.  Rising
poverty  is not a  special problem  of rural America,  but  a  common
problem of all America.  And the future of U.S.  agriculture,  like the
future  of U.S.  manufacturing,  banking  or retailing,  will be much
more  dependent  on how U.S.  farmers use  new technology  to add
value  to their operations than it will on American agriculture's ability
to  mobilize political support  for new  farm programs or foreign trade
initiatives.
Lessons from the Eighties,  Strategies for the Nineties
While  the $1 trillion that American  employers  spent on workplace
technology  during the  1980s  did not increase  our productivity,  it did
buy  us  a lot  of valuable  experience.  In  particular,  we  began to  un-
derstand  the true nature  of the  information revolution  and  what
must be  done  to derive  improved performance  from electronic  info-
com technology.  The lessons  of the  1980s,  while learned  principally
in  America's factories  and offices,  are equally relevant to America's
farms  and  rural communities.  The universal  application  of these
lessons,  in turn,  will be essential to the revitalization of all sectors  of
the U.S.  economy  and the restoration  of our competitiveness  and
prosperity.
To begin with,  it is now clear that, in the Twenty-first Century,  we
are  all going  to be  "information"  workers.  This does  not mean  we
will  all have college  degrees,  wear tailored  clothing and spend most
of our time at  desks in offices.  There will still be millions of blue  col-
lar and consumer service jobs in the Twenty-first Century, but all
jobs-from  the shop  floor to the  executive  suite,  from  the  farm and
forge  to fast  foods  and  pharmaceuticals-every  job will  have  more
information  content in  it. Moreover,  to perform  these jobs, it  will be
necessary  for the worker to be able to use information  to make
important decisions  on a daily, hourly and moment-to-moment  basis.
In the words of Harvard professor Shoshona Zuboff in her prescient
book,  The Age of the Smart Machine, in the 1990s,  we are  all going to
be "informated."
Already,  hotels are training their bellmen to conduct structured
exit  interviews  of departing  guests.  Rental car lot attendants  are
being equipped with palm-top computers to calculate rental charges,
record  complaints and print receipts at carside.  By the end of the
decade,  essentially  all  factory  workers  will  not  only be  expected  to
use computers  on the  line,  but to  use  statistical  process control  and
Pereto  analysis,  and  to work in performance  improvement teams
made up not only  of co-workers,  but representatives  of suppliers
and  customers.  Retailers  are  already  being  provided  with  ever-
more-detailed,  real-time  information  regarding  which  combinations
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est profits.
Farmers,  too,  will  increasingly  be  informated.  Computerized  ex-
pert systems  will  improve  crop  and animal yields  while reducing
costs.  Electronic  networks  are providing a growing number of farm-
ers with easy access  to the latest agricultural  research and moment-
to-moment  info, mation on future commodity demands and prices.
Mounting pressure  from ecologists to cleanse  farming of all chem-
icals  in order  to protect  consumers  and the  environment  from  agri-
cultural  pollution  is  likely to  force  more  stringent  regulations  upon
farmers,  thereby accelerating  the growth  of organic  farming with its
considerably  more  sophisticated  information  requirements.  Produc-
ing for global  markets-and  for more  culturally  diverse  domestic
North American  markets-can  also  be  expected  to substantially  in-
crease  the diversity  of information required  by food producers  to
compete effectively.
Distinctive  Enterprise Attributes in the Information Age
By purposefully  incorporating  more information  into all of their
planning and  decision  making,  farmers-like  those  in  all  other pro-
ductive  enterprises-can  improve  the  marketplace  performance  of
their operations  in three specific ways:
Adaptive Enterprise. Under the industrial  system of mass produc-
tion  for mass markets,  individual enterprises  have characteristically
concentrated  on producing  a limited  number of outputs for a specific
set  of buyers or customers  year-in,  year-out.  An  interruption  either
in the supply of raw materials or customer demand generally  leaves
the industrial-style  producer at the mercy of external  forces, with no
alternate  sources  of supply or alternative buyer for the organiza-
tion's products or services.
The  "informated"  enterprise,  by comparison,  maintains  an up-to-
date  inventory  of alternate  suppliers,  distributors  and  buyers.  The
informed  producer  also  knows  the  full range  of outputs  its existing
resources  may  be used  to  produce.  In  anticipation  of probable
changes in its operating environment, the adaptive enterprise "infor-
mates" (trains) its employees to be able to perform a variety of tasks,
as  opposed  to  the  single skills  of industrial  age workers.  In fact,  by
informing  itself about probable  changes  in economic,  technologic
and social  externalities, the informated  enterprise  is able to take ad-
vantage of changes in its operating environment,  creating new prod-
ucts and meeting emerging marketplace  demands,  even as the rigid,
reactive  industrial-style producer seeks protection from the effects of
external change and longs  for the good  old days of "business  as usu-
al."
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rapidly increase  the ease and  reduce  the cost of accessing  and
applying useful information to all of our decisions,  plans and designs,
all  products  and services  will be more precisely  tailored to  the  spe-
cific  needs of individual buyers  or  users.  Human  factors  engineers,
for example,  will  incorporate  ergonomic  characteristics  into the  de-
sign of all tools,  work stations and production equipment,  dramat-
ically increasing  general levels  of user  productivity over  the next
generation  of durable goods.  Already,  information products, from
mass mailings and magazine  advertising to insurance  policies  and
credit cards,  are being targeted  at  narrower  and narrower  specific
markets, and manufactured  goods are about to follow.
Laser tailors in London  and New  York  are  measuring customers
and cutting out perfect  suits "while  you wait."  In Japan,  retail sales
outlets  of the National Bicycle  Company  offer  customers  a standing
model  bike that  is  universally  adjustable  to  each  buyer's  measure-
ments. Data from the floor model,  set to an individual  buyer's speci-
fications,  are  transmitted  to  the  factory  which  manufactures  the
custom bike within two weeks for only 10 percent more than a mass-
produced  bicycle.  A growing  number  of producers  of manufactured
housing in Japan and the United States design customized homes for
clients on computers that produce drawings,  specifications  and parts
lists  for rapid assembly.  And the  Iacocca Institute at Lehigh  Univer-
sity, Bethelem,  Pennsylvania,  has produced  a proposal, 21st Century
Manufacturing  Enterprise Strategy, that envisions an American auto
industry  that,  within  fifteen years,  will be  able  to  build and  deliver
custom-made,  defect-free  cars within three  days  of receiving the
order from the dealer.
Efficient Enterprise. One  important  result of  the  greater  pre-
ciseness with which informated operations make plans and decisions
will be the increasing efficiencies  of such operations.  In this context,
the concept  of efficiency  includes,  but goes  considerably beyond,
traditional  economic  notions  of the productive  uses of capital,  labor
and raw materials  to incorporate the environmental  costs of using
alternative  production  processes  and  resources.  Over  the  next  ten
years,  the  "Total  Quality"  movement  and  the environmental  move-
ment will converge  in the informated  enterprise to make manifest a
fundamental  operating principle originally coined by Henry Ford:
"If it doesn't add value,  it's waste!"
As we get better and better at applying all available information to
the design of all of our products and the processes by which we pro-
duce and distribute them,  we will gradually eliminate  the great bulk
of scrap material,  harmful by-products  and residual waste  of all en-
terprise,  including  agriculture.  Our ability to add value by adding in-
formation  to  all  of our  productive  activities,  including  farming,  will
26be  crucial  to  sustaining  the  economic  survival  and  prosperity  of
those  activities.
Transformation to Information-Intensive  Farming
In the abstract,  the vision  of a mature,  information-intensive  U.S.
agricultural  sector is enormously  appealing.  Instead of concentrating
almost entirely upon twenty-five  to thirty commercial  crops for most
of their income,  America's  informated  farms  would  be producing  a
rich mix of products ranging from food and flowers  to fibers,  dyes
and pharmaceuticals.  Researchers  in the United  States,  Great  Brit-
ain and The Netherlands  have already produced therapeutic  pro-
teins in the blood  and milk of farm animals  for substantially lower
costs than the same  compounds  produced  in the laboratory.  And,
around  the  world,  geneticists  have  announced  ongoing  break-
throughs in producing  vaccines  in plants,  as  well as bio-polymers-
natural plastics that will  degrade  in landfills.  Genetic  engineering  is
also improving the efficiency with which  the environmentally  safe
fuel ethanol can be produced from cellulistic bio-mass.
Transgenic  research  also  shows  great promise  for increasing  the
value  of plant and animal food products,  by improving their taste,
appearance,  texture  and preservability.  But the outlook for trans-
genic  foods  is,  at  this moment,  problematical,  due  to the  legitimate
concerns  of some  portions  of the scientific community about the un-
known cumulative  effects upon humans of consuming  large amounts
of genetically altered  material that does not occur in the natural eco-
system.  While this debate is likely  to constrain the widespread intro-
duction  of transgenic  food crops  and farm  animals  in the  United
States, the use of transgenic  farm products as a source of fiber,  fuel,
chemicals and materials is likely to grow rapidly from now on.
So long as consumer preference  and environmentalist  pressure
continue to foster the growth  of organic food production,  informa-
tion-intensive  farmers will be better able to keep up with new devel-
opments  in  this  rapidly  expanding  field,  as  well  as  with  the
emergence  of new marketplace demands.  And, should concern  over
ecological degradation  from chemical intensive,  industrial-style
farming  ultimately  lead  to the  legislature's  mandating  of organic
farming,  electronic  information  networks  would be critical  to Ameri-
can agriculture's  ability to make such a changeover without disas-
trous reductions in output and concomitant  price increases.
Expanded  exploration  of the  world's  250,000  naturally-occurring
plant species for potentially desirable commercial  characteristics  will
also be  a source  of greater  diversification  in agricultural production
as  farming becomes  more information intensive.  The New York Bo-
tanical  Garden has just signed  a $3  million contract with a  major
pharmaceutical  company  to search through its  collection for medici-
nally beneficial  plants.  Similarly,  the increasingly  rich ethnic  mix  of
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cultural products,  will offer ever-increasing  diversity of marketplace
demand for the output of America's farms.
Starting Now:  Some  Purposeful Policy  Interventions
Having made themselves  "adaptive,  precise and efficient" by their
diligent use of information and information technology,  U.S. farmers
could begin to reverse the effects of mass-market industrialization
and restore family farming as a viable basis  for long-term prosperity
in much  of rural America.  By adding  more  information to every as-
pect of their operations,  a large proportion of small farms  should be
able to identify high-value niche markets for which they can profita-
bly produce.  But such  a scenario  is unlikely  to  occur without  some
purposeful  interventions  in national  farm  policies and  programs.  In
particular, three interventions  would be  instrumental  to  revitalizing
family farming and small town America:
1.  The Rural  Electrification Administration  (REA) and its Rural
Electric  Cooperatives,  having  satisfactorily  accomplished  their
original mission, should now be redirected to install an informa-
tion infrastructure-or  "info-structure"-for  rural America,  in-
cluding  electronic  information  networks,  common-use  data
bases,  program libraries  and  learning  systems,  etc.,  linking
farmers,  extension agents,  agricultural  research  stations,  com-
mercial suppliers and buyers with one  another.  A principal  ob-
jective of the REA should  be to link all of America's farms by
fiber optic cable.  This new Rural "Computerization"  Admin-
istration  and  its  Rural  "Information"  Cooperatives  should  en-
courage  the acquisition  of computers and other electronic  infor-
mation  technologies  by  individual  farmers  and  farm
households,  through  subsidies,  bulk purchases  and low  cost
loans.  While America's prosperous  farms are already moving to
informate  themselves,  most  smaller,  marginal  farms are  un-
likely to invest in info-com technology  without assistance and
encouragement.
2.  While the Agricultural Extension  and Home Extension  Services
will  need  to  continue  pursuing  their traditional  missions,  they
must-between  now and the end of the Twenty-first Century-
give  priority  to making America's  farmers  sufficiently  "info-
competent"  that they can make full productive use of com-
puters  and the  productive  knowledge  and  power  tools  they
make available.  During the  1980s,  employers learned  that,  in
order  to  get the  full yield  out  of new  workplace  technology,  it
was necessary  to  spend  one  dollar  on training  for every  dollar
spent  on  technology.  The  speed  with  which  potential  users
learn mastery to  apply a new  technology is the principal  gover-
nor  of an organization's-or  a nation's-overall  rate  of tech-
nology adoption.
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America's  info-structure,  an obvious-and crucial-role  for  ex-
tension would be to assure that all rural Americans-especially
those in the agricultural community-are  able to use the new
technologies  to their fullest  potential.  Given the relatively  small
number  of the total population directly  involved  in farming-or
directly  in-putting  to  farms  and  directly  taking  output  from
farms-it should be possible  within ten years to make  agri-
culture the first entire sector of the U.S. economy  to be com-
pletely equipped  and trained to make  full productive  use of in-
formation technology.  In addition  to substantially reducing
USDA's costs to perform  many  of its various  information,  edu-
cational and regulatory roles,  the informating of the nation's ag-
ricultural  community would  set the stage for the de-indus-
trialization  of farming,  creating  a new  economic  base  for rural
America.
3.  As technology  and training  improve the capacity  of farmers  to
be  "adaptive,  precise  and  efficient,"  rural  economic  develop-
ment  programs,  policies and practices  should  increasingly shift
toward  promoting new agricultural  enterprise.  Farm-to-market
electronic  networks  should  enable  farmers throughout  the  na-
tion to locate  and develop  niche  markets nationwide,  just as
Nineteenth  Century  farm-to-market  roads  enabled  farmers  to
reach regional markets with their products.  Given modern
transport, burgeoning foreign and domestic markets for special-
ty  produce  can  be  met by farms throughout  the U.S.  ethnic
markets,  gourmet markets, restaurant markets, organic  mar-
kets, industrial and research markets,  etc.
Electronic  networks will permit the rapid organization  of pro-
ducer  cooperatives  and the easy  sharing of information  among
peers which is essential  for widespread  producer innovations  in
all forms of commerce.  Electronic  networks  would also make  it
easy for food processors and packagers  to assemble consortia  of
suppliers  for specific  ingredients  required  by new product
lines.  Individual farms  or farm partnerships  could  process  and
package pre-prepared  foods themselves  targeted at specialty
markets  and  advertised  over  electronic  bulletin  boards.  Farm-
ers who  are unusually  proficient in particular  product lines,  or
in coaxing high yields out of marginal  land, would be able  to
sell their expertise to colleagues  around the world.
Keeping  Rural America  Rural
Interestingly,  there are  a number  of promising potential nonfarm
forces  for  economic  development  in rural  America  today.  In about
one-half of the nation's 2,000 rural counties  today,  the population  is
growing  as fast  as the national average,  or faster!  In more  than  500
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er than the nation's average,  as population  has migrated  out of near-
by cities  and suburbs into the  countryside.  This reversal  of the cen-
turies-old urbanization trend has also been noted in Western Europe
and,  on both sides  of the Atlantic,  the explanations involve  a number
of similar factors.
To begin with,  as  advanced  technology  and  organizational  re-en-
gineering have reduced the labor required  for manufacturing,  fewer
factories need  to be located  near  large labor pools,  During the  first
half of the  Twentieth  Century, individual  steel mills typically  em-
ployed  1,500 to  3,000 workers,  with the  largest having more  than
15,000 employees.  Such operations had to draw upon large labor re-
serves that only cities possessed.  But,  now that technology  has
squeezed  85  percent of the labor out of 1950s manufacturing,  new
steel mills  required only  175  to 350  workers,  and they  are being  lo-
cated  in places  such as Crawfordsville,  Indiana,  and Plymouth,
Utah,  not  Cleveland  and  Pittsburgh.  new  auto plants-requiring
roughly just 1,250 employees-are  now popping up  in Smyrna, Ten-
nessee, and Normal, Illinois, not in Flint or Detroit.
The reason for the urban-industrial  out-migration is straightfor-
ward enough. Cities are expensive  places in which to live and work;
land costs are  high, labor costs are  high,  tax rates are high.  Con-
fronted  by increasing foreign  competition from countries with cheap
labor,  a growing  number  of U.S.  industrial  firms have been moving
from the cities and suburbs to the countryside,  where business oper-
ating  costs are typically  15  percent to 25  percent lower than in adja-
cent metropolitan  areas.  While  some  economists  and demographers
believe  that  the  fifteen-year  spurt  of  "greenfielding"  high-value
manufacturing  operations into rural areas is now beginning  to de-
cline,  others believe  that the  migration of manufacturers  into the
countryside  will continue  unabated,  draining  economic  vitality  from
the  city and bringing  it to the land.  Policy interventions,  such as the
creation  of "enterprise"  and  "empowerment"  zones  by federal  and
state  governments,  will clearly have some impact on this aspect of
the rural future.
Whether greenfielding  remains an important source of future rural
growth,  other trends  seem  likely to sustain  a  rural revitalization.
Some  states,  such  as Kentucky,  are promoting the  availability  of
their skilled,  under-employed  rural  work force  to urban  employers
via  electronic  networks.  Electronic  information  technology  will  per-
mit telecommuting,  both by salaried workers and the self-employed.
These folks-designers,  editors, graphic illustrators,  researchers,
software  writers,  consultants,  etc.-can  live  anywhere  they  choose
that the info-structure  permits.  A  large  share of this  small, but
rapidly growing, population  is choosing to live in rural areas because
of the high  quality-and  relatively  low cost-of living.  And  these
people are bringing their incomes with them.
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other rapidly-growing  flow of migrants into rural America-retirees.
About 40  percent  of retirees  who  move  inter-state  when they retire
now end up in rural areas, and in those 500 rural counties experienc-
ing the  most rapid  growth  rates over the  past twenty years,  relocat-
ing  retirees  represented  half or more  of their  growth.  Recreational
development  has  also boosted  rural economies  since the 1970s,  often
in conjunction  with planned  retirement  communities  and "full  serv-
ice"  condominium developments.  While the  popular image of resort
developments  is that they are  set  in sites with golden  beaches  or
snow covered ski slopes,  a growing percentage  are found along mid-
western rivers,  in the lakes of the Ozarks and among the hills and
ponds of northern Michigan.
These in-flows of population  and employment have already  begun
to revitalize  large areas  of rural America.  But, where they have oc-
curred, these developments  have necessarily  changed the character
of rural America.  While the U.S. Department  of Commerce  extols
the opportunities offered by "non-urban growth centers"-i.e.,  pros-
pering rural areas served by regional airports and interstate high-
ways-these  new communities  are  strikingly different  from tradi-
tional,  "small  town"  America.  Modern  commercial  development
"suburbanizes"  rural areas,  turning them into continuous  strip malls
of fast food clusters, auto dealerships,  retail chain outlets and trailer
parks. If rural America  is to remain  a unique cultural entity,  it must
retain  its low  density  populations,  scattered  sparsely  across  a land-
scape,  of productive and profitable  working farms,  and not five-acre
"farmettes."
This does not mean we should attempt to bar the suburbanization
of rural areas.  To the contrary,  the  migration of footloose  industries
to  rural areas-common  to  all  mature industrial  nations-is  clearly
an  adoptive phenomenon of the free market that is beneficial to na-
tional economies  in the aggregate.  Similarly,  it would be inappropri-
ate  to  use  policy  intervention  to  prevent  the  withdrawal  of  agri-
cultural production  from marginal farm land, or the draining  of
population from regions in which the industrialized  mass production
of commodity crops represents optimum land use.
America's  two  million square  miles  of rural land  should  be man-
aged as the  multi-dimensional  national  asset it is,  and not  simply
shaped to  look like  a single  uniform ideal of what a rural landscape
ought to look  like.  In this respect,  the USDA  should  take its  lead
from the U.S. Department of the Interior,  which has made a commit-
ment to institute a comprehensive  plan of "ecosystem  management"
for all public lands. America's agricultural  lands should be regarded
as a  finite resource  of inestimable  value.  Land that is  marginal
should be  removed  from  production,  renewed  and  husbanded
against  a future  time when  climatalogical  changes,  ecological  disas-
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be returned to production.
Similarly,  rural land that is suitable for raising a wide variety  of
high-value  agricultural  products should  be utilized  in an environ-
mentally  sound  manner to  meet appropriate  marketplace  needs by
farmers  whose  mastery  of information  technology  enables  them to
be  "adaptive,  precise  and efficient"  commercial  enterprises,  rather
than captive  providers  of a  handful  of bulk products  at  commodity
prices to food processors and packagers who add most of the per-
ceived  value  and make  most  of the  profits.  In summary,  just as  we
are reinventing business, government,  education and health care  for
the post-industrial  era,  we  must also  reinvent  agriculture  for the
twenty-first  century.
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